COALITION DEMOKRATISCHES SYRIEN (KDS)

EUROPEAN COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC SYRIA

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Time to Engage Syria?
9-13-2006 14:43:39

Despite a temporary cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, Syria remains key to any settlement in what has become one big mess in the Middle East.

The U.S. looks upon Syria as a supporter of terrorism. That's true, from Hamas, Hezbollah, al Qaeda to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command. Without Syria, Hezbollah cannot receive arms, missiles and other resources from Iran to wage war against Israel.

While we undertook regime change in Iraq by invading it, the U.S. cannot take similar action in every country it dislikes. However, there is good reason to believe recent U.S. policy toward Syria actually has driven it closer to Iran and Hezbollah.

This was no more apparent than just prior to U.S. action in Iraq in March 2003. Months prior to that , the Syrians sought to open a back channel with policymakers in the defense secretary's office. The request came through my office.

In exchange, the Syrians requested U.S. assistance in economic infrastructure development. The Syrians even offered to stage U.S. troops to go into Iraq to look for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as an unconditional basis to avoid a U.S. attack. Those offers were turned down.

By offering a back channel, the Syrians suggested there was information that would be shared with the United States that it would not provide publicly. Indeed, the Syrians were asked whether Iraqi WMD had been sent to Syria prior to U.S. action.

The response, from no less than one of Syrian President Bashar Assad's top advisers, was that publicly Syria would deny their existence in Syria. However, if the back channel were created, "There would be a lot we could talk about."

Sources with direct access to the Syrians say elements among them seek reform and are pro-American. The offer of a back channel suggested such a prospect.

However, the Bush administration never followed up on the offer. Instead, then Secretary of State Colin Powell in May 2003 visited Syria and publicly confronted and admonished Mr. Assad. Mr. Powell accused Syria of harboring Saddam Hussein's escaped leadership and Iraq's WMD.

The admonition received a Syrian response similar to what the U.S. received after publicly raking the Chinese over the political coals. The Chinese would refuse further discussion on topics of substance. Eventually, the U.S. sought quiet policy-level diplomacy with the Chinese, which produced some positive results.

The Syrian response to the Powell confrontation was predictable. Syria turned to Iran to improve its already good relations.

I'm not an apologist for Syria. In fact, an Aug. 31, 2004, Boston Globe article quoted two anonymous congressional committee sources as saying I was being investigated for trying to overthrow the Syrian government for my prewar efforts.

Unfortunately, U.S. policymakers in the days leading up to U.S. action in Iraq and afterward left to the Central Intelligence Agency any initiatives to Syria. The CIA jealously coveted its own exclusive back channel to Syria. So the CIA made every effort to scuttle the Syrian opening of a back channel to U.S. policymakers.

This became apparent when the CIA rejected a Syrian initiative months prior to U.S. action in Iraq to present Saddam Hussein's unconditional terms. Once rejected, the CIA then subverted an eleventh-hour Syrian initiative to present the same terms to U.S. policymakers through my office.

The CIA was so upset with this attempt that it even accused a number of us in the office of the undersecretary of defense for policy of attempting to run a "rogue" operation to bypass the agency. That wasn't true, since the CIA was informed of all steps. Informing the CIA, however, helped CIA elements more interested in damaging the Bush administration to scuttle that attempt.

Syrians interested in working closer with the U.S. saw for themselves the CIA's scuttling efforts. In turn, the Syrians decided to close its own channel with CIA.

In October 2003, then-CIA Director George Tenet went to Syria to try to patch up the CIA-Syrian channel. This did not succeed.

In November 2003 Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, effectively imposing U.S. sanctions on Syria. On May 11, 2004, President Bush signed an Executive Order carrying out provisions of the sanctions. The whole idea was to get the Syrians out of Lebanon. It finally happened after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005, in which the United States accused Syria of involvement. A U.N. investigation continues.

But that is where U.S. policy toward Lebanon ended. It failed to bolster the fledgling Lebanese government or back the Christian Lebanese who were always the Bush administration's most ardent supporters. In part, U.S. inaction was due to the continued presence of Lebanon's Syrian-backed Christian President Emile Lahoud.

Because the U.S. fixated on driving the Syrians from Lebanon, Iran quickly filled the power vacuum through its Hezbollah proxy. When you look at it, the net effect of U.S. policy from Iraq to Lebanon has been to enhance Iran's Shi'ite role.

Nevertheless, the Syrians again have offered to help find a diplomatic solution. Perhaps we could inject some creative diplomacy. Call the Syrians on their offer. See if they will first wean themselves from supporting terrorists and Iran, and stop acting as a conduit of logistical support to Hezbollah and stay out of Lebanon.

If they can do all this, we offer the Syrians the badly needed economic infrastructure aid they sought from the U.S. in early 2003. Nothing ventured, nothing gained. This might just prevent a larger explosion in the Middle East.

By F. Michael Maloof
Washington Times

F. Michael Maloof is a former senior security policy analyst in the Office of the Defense Secretary.
Syria Planned U.S. Embassy Attack?
9-14-2006 0:29:6

According to well-informed Syrian sources, the September 12 terrorist attack against the U.S. embassy in Damascus is one of the "Machiavellian" Assad operations.

Let's remind ourselves that the Syrian regime's senior strategists and intelligence officers were trained by the sophisticated "intox" schools of the former Soviet's KGB. One of the main tactics of this old school, refined by Hafez Assad during his rule of Syria is based on the following concept: If the equation is to your disadvantage, create a new problem, offer to solve it, obtain recognition; and by that you'd change the equation.

The strategic objective of the Assad regime today is to deter Washington from further pressures against Syria, in the form of the Hariri investigation, the U.S. pressure through the Security Council to deploy forces along the borders with Lebanon and the American ongoing support to the anti-Syrian Government in Beirut.

The Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis is in dire need to "contain" Washington's pressures and gain time, as much possible of time. Why would they need time? Because they have to rearm Hezbollah, crumble the Lebanese Government, and face off with UN pressures on the nuclear issue. Syria has the marching orders to disorient the United States, and hence it adopted a twin approach:

* Allow a Jihadist-type terror attack to take place against a US interest in Damascus. And how can that be possible? The seasoned experts on Syria knows all too well that the Assad Mukhabarat are in control of, or have "access" to the overwhelming Terrorist organizations in Syria and Lebanon. They've had thirty years of deep involvement to accomplish this takeover. In addition to Shiia Hezbollah, Syria has control, a remote-control of, or an access to Sunni Salafists groups, including networks that connects with al Qaeda. In short, Syria's intelligence services can prepare the ground to "persuade" Jihadists to strike at some point. The Jihadists have an ideological and strategic enmity with the US; the Assad regime has the ability to have the "mob" unleash attacks, in the same way the Baath regime of Syria has "allowed" thousands of Jihadists to cross the border to Iraq to kill US and coalition troops. Assad the father also "allowed" Jihadis to attack U.S and French interests in Lebanon during the 1980s. More recently, Assad "allowed' violent demonstrations to attack embassies in Damascus. Knowing that Syria's State police controls the country with an iron hand, these precedents are too bright to ignore. In today's apparatus two men dominate the Terror web from their security intelligence positions: Mohammed Nassif, the director of State Security and Ali Yunis, the assistant of Asaf Shawkat, the regime's security commander. Nassif and Yunis are the team that controls and connects with the Jihadist underworld in the Levant.
* Stage the "protection" -- After the operation happens, the regime allows some of their men to be killed in action against the "Terrorists." Obviously, this move will be hard to absorb by Western and American public psychologically. Maybe Hollywood movies writers can. In short (as an analytical projection) the regime "allowed" the operation to happen, "knew" it would happen, and let the security guards on the ground sacrifice themselves in the line of diplomatic duty.

The Dividends:

1. Sending a message to the U.S as follow: "Al Qaeda can strike you in our midst (Syria and Lebanon) and we can't do much about, except the classical protection once the 'cells' would be about to engage or have already engaged. In short we are extending the measures under international laws, not more."
2. "But, we can stop them." Meaning that "our 'powerful' intelligence and security agencies can go after these terrorists (who aren't Syria's friends to start with) and offer them to you, as we used to do in the good old days: We'd send Hezbollah to kill your Marines in Lebanon and allow the Salafists to kill the Marines again in Iraq, but at the same time we can do business with you and 'protect your' embassies from the terrorists we are harboring anyway." Yes a good Levantine maze.
3. "Your public, via international media, 'saw' that we are defending your embassy and have 'lost' security guards while defending it. So what are you going to tell your public? That we, the Syrian regime, 'are' the terrorists? It will look bad when after we sacrificed our men for your diplomats, your diplomats would call us terrorists."
4. Secretary Rice "had" to issue a statement "thanking" Syria. In Assad's mind, it would be an embarrassment for the U.S. to attack Syria for being a harbor to terrorism when Damascus has just been thanked for fighting those terrorists. This, basically, would gain more "time" for Assad. Enough time needed to:
5. Rearm Hezbollah, prepare attacks against UN and other multinational forces to come closer to the Syrian borders, and of course to allow the other pressures to recede.
6. Extra dividend: Unleash the school that supports "dialogue and friendship" with the Syrian regime in Washington to advance its arguments in this regard.

A question has been fusing in the media about Zawahiri's calls for the Levant Jihadists, including the Jund al Sham to attack targets in Syria and Lebanon.

Are these video messages coordinated with Syria and Iran? While no evidence is surfacing yet, these are two Jihadi wars taking place against the U.S. and its allies at the same time. In the midst of an Al Qaeda war and of a Khumeinist-Baathist campaign, both directed against democracies in the region, overlapping actions aren't impossible.

Otherwise, how to explain that al Qaeda waited so long before it issued a direct Jihad-guideline on Lebanon and Syria after 14 years of war against the U.S. and three years of war in Iraq? Why would the number-two of al Qaeda suddenly develop an interest in the Lebanese-Syrian battlefield, immediately after the ceasefire was concluded between Hezbollah and Israel? Who needed whom to begin the next stage in troubles after the issuing of UNSCR 1701?

Let's call it the quiz of the month: You'll find your answer in Machiavelli's writings.

By Walid Phares
www.reportingwar.com

Walid Phares holds degrees in law and political science from Saint Joseph University and the Lebanese University in Beirut, a Masters in international law from the Universite de Lyons in France and a Ph.D. in international relations and strategic studies from the University of Miami. He has taught and lectured at numerous universities worldwide, practiced law in Beirut, and served as publisher of Sawt el-Mashreq and Mashrek International. He currently teaches Middle East political issues, ethnic and religious conflict, and comparative politics at Florida Atlantic University. Dr. Phares has written seven books on the Middle East and published hundreds of articles in newspapers and scholarly publications such as Global Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, and Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies. He has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, NBC, CBS, ABC, PBS, and BBC as well as on radio broadcasts. Aside from serving on the boards of several national and international think tanks and human rights associations, Dr. Phares has testified before the US Senate Subcommittee on the Middle East and South East Asia and regularly conducts congressional and State Department briefings.

Dr. Phares is a visiting fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels and a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C. His most recent book is Future Jihad, and he was the author of the memo that introduced UNSCR 1559 in 2004.

Syria Blames US for Embassy Attack in Damascus
9-13-2006 18:15:52

DAMASCUS (AP) -- Syria is blaming American policies on Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinians for feeding the Islamic militancy and yesterday's attack on the US Embassy in Damascus.

The only attacker to survive the assault has died in a hospital before he could be questioned. He'd been driving an explosives-packed truck that failed to go off.

Three of the other suspected Islamic militants were killed in the brazen assault yesterday. Syrian guards exchanged gunfire outside the compound with the attackers, who shouted "God is great" and tried to storm in with automatic weapons and hand grenades.

A Syrian guard was killed in the attack. No Americans were hurt.


Why Syria May Be The Real Victim Of The Attack
9-13-2006 0:53:59

Coming a day after the fifth anniversary of 9/11 and following another videotaped al-Qaeda vow to stage new attacks, Tuesday morning's foiled terrorist raid on the American embassy in Damascus is certainly cause for U.S. concern. A Syrian interrogation of one surviving attacker will seek to determine whether the incident was in fact the work of al-Qaeda or that of other individuals seeking to add to the carnage. Anti-American feelings are high throughout the Middle East, which in recent months has been gripped not only by the war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but the ferocious summer battles between Israel and Hizballah in Lebanon. With radicals blaming the U.S. in all three wars, it is prudent to assume that some of them may seize this opportunity to strike.

But the Syrian regime itself may have more to worry about in this particular attack than the U.S. That's because as it may have been intended as a riposte to Washington, the raid was a bold challenge to the rule of President Bashar Assad. The attack was carried out by as many as four Islamic militants shouting Muslim slogans in the heart of Damascus's diplomatic quarter not far from Assad's own residence -- in short, one of the most heavily protected neighborhoods in Syria, if not the Middle East. The attackers failed to kill any American diplomats, and Syrian security guards apparently managed to slay three of the assailants. But that doesn't mean the terrorists were bumbling amateurs.

Bitterly at odds with Washington, Assad's regime has sometimes allowed militants to get too close to the U.S. embassy. During an anti-American demonstration in 2000, security forces looked the other way as a mob stormed the grounds and ransacked the American mission. Amid last winter's protests over Danish cartoons viewed as mocking the Prophet Mohammed, demonstrators burned the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus.

But allowing terrorists to hit a foreign embassy is a different matter altogether. For one thing, Assad's regime knows that could be a casus belli for a U.S. military strike on Syria. Relations have been tense for years. The U.S. recalled its ambassador in Damascus after Syria, despite its denials, was implicated in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in February 2005. Mobs are one thing, but terrorism tells the Syrian people something that no dictator wishes to show: that the regime does not have as tight a grip on the country as it would like its citizens to believe.

What the attack shows, in fact, is that the Syrian regime's own long war with Islamic extremists is heating up again. In 1982, the regime of Assad's late father, Hafez, obliterated sections of the Syrian city of Hama, killing an estimated 20,000 people, to quell an uprising by the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. The Assad dynasty's iron rule has kept the lid on discontent for most of the time since. But during the last few years, new attacks seem to herald the return of violent extremists. Just three months ago, in one of the Syrian capital's most prominent public squares, four gunmen were killed trying to attack the building housing Syrian state television. In 2004, the government blamed terrorists for setting off a car bomb in West Damascus near several ministries and embassies.

Another way to look at it is that the Syrian regime may be reaping what it sows. Among Arab leaders, Assad is alone in his outspoken support for Islamic militant groups like Hizballah in Lebanon, and the Palestinan factions, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. U.S. officials believe that the Assad regime has secretly aided the three-year-old Sunni insurgency in Iraq, providing passage for jihad volunteers and funds, and safe haven for insurgency leaders. At the start of the war in 2003, Arab jihadists who poured into Damascus en route to Baghdad were allowed to openly line up outside the Iraqi embassy just down the road from the American embassy.

Assad, whose regime is officially secular despite its close alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, often casts himself as the champion of radical Islamic movements. Last month, in a speech openly ridiculing moderate Arab leaders, he hailed Hizballah's war in Lebanon as a stinging defeat for Israel that undercut American plans for the region. But it is beginning to look like at least some of the Islamists consider his regime the enemy, too.

By Scott Macleod
www.time.com

SHCR HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS

Following up the Arrests in al-Raqqa

With reference to the press release issued by the Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) on the 29/8/2006, it has been confirmed from various sources that the number of those arrested in al-Raqqa on the 23/8/2006, after being provoked by elements supported by the Syrian Intelligence, were in fact 14 citizens. They are: Ibrahim al-Mulla, Ahmed al-Khalaf al-Rumi, Hasan al-Ashoor, Khalid Sultan, Khalaf al-Huwaysh, Ramadan Ramadan, Salih al-Rahhal, Abdullah al-Shawakh al-Jarnab, Abdulfattah Shahada, Eid al-Rahlan, Issa al-Salih, Issa al-Taraad, Mostafa al-Mostafa, and Yassir Hussein al-Ahmed.

Today, four of the detainees were arrested. They include: Ahmed al-Khalaf al-Rumi, Hasan Ashoor, Ramadan Ramadan and Salih al-Rahhal.

The Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC), which does not find any justification for detaining the mentioned citizens, requests the Syrian Authorities once again to release them immediately. SHRC also calls for an end of provocations among followers of religious schools of thought, to end all arbitrary arrests, and grant citizens their freedoms so they can practice them as is their rights.

Syrian Human Rights Committee

8/9/2006
Damaskus-Spur führt zum Mossad?
War Israel in Terroranschlag auf US-Botschaft in Syrien verstrickt?
Rainer Rupp
Nach dem vereitelten Anschlag auf die US-Botschaft in Damaskus hat die staatliche syrische Nachrichtenagentur SANA erklärt, die vier am Angriff vom Dienstag beteiligten »Takfiri«-Kämpfer würden zur Gruppe »Jund Al Sham« gehören. Unklar ist aber, wer hinter der obskuren Organisation und dem Feuerüberfall steckt.

»Takfiri« ist eine arabische Bezeichnung für islamistische Extremisten, die gegen »normal« lebende Muslime vorgehen; »Jund Al Sham« bedeutet soviel wie »Soldaten Syriens«, bzw. »Soldaten der Levante«. Zur Zeit ihrer Gründung in Afghanistan wurden der kleinen Gruppe lose Verbindungen zum Terrornetzwerk Al Qaida nachgesagt. Nach der Eroberung Afghanistans durch US-Truppen im Herbst 2001 war es um sie allerdings still geworden. Erst vor drei Jahren machte »Jund Al Sham« wieder auf sich aufmerksam. Am 2. August 2003 wurde ein führendes Mitglied der libanesischen Hisbollah, Ali Hussein Saleh, in Südbeirut von einer Bombe zerfetzt, als er sein Auto starten wollte. Saleh war Verbindungsoffizier der Schiitenmiliz zu militanten Palästinenserorganisationen im von Israel besetzten Westjordanland. Hisbollah machte daher umgehend den israelischen Geheimdienst Mossad für den Mord verantwortlich, obwohl die »kaum bekannte sunnitische Extremistengruppe ›Jund Al Sham‹« – so die BBC damals – sich in einem Schreiben zu dem Anschlag bekannt hatte. Es folgten weitere, professionell ausgeführte Attentate gegen Führungskräfte der Hisbollah und der Palästinenser im Libanon.

Am 21. Juli 2004 starb in Beirut Ghaleb Awali auf die gleiche Weise wie sein Vorgänger Saleh. Obwohl sich auch diesesmal »Jund al-Sham« zu dem Anschlag auf den Hisbollah-Offizier bekannte und sich brüstete, »ein Symbol des Verrats« zu haben, machte die Hisbollah-Führung wieder Israel für den »heimtückischen Mord« verantwortlich.

Kurz vor Beginn des israelischen Krieges gegen Libanon in diesem Sommer schließlich hatte der libanesische Sicherheitsdienst einen Agentenring des Mossad enttarnt, auf dessen Konto nachweislich die Ermordung von Ali Saleh und Ghaleb Awali sowie mehrerer im Libanon lebender Palästinenser ging. Für all diese Verbrechen hatte zuvor allerdings »Jund Al Sham« die Verantwortung übernommen. Die angeblich islamistische Gruppe weist mithin eine verblüffende Übereinstimmung mit israelischen Interessen auf.


Syria: Embassy Attack Linked to Militants?
STRATFOR INTELLIGENCE

The U.S. embassy in Damascus is reported to have come under attack, with reports of heavy gunfire and loud explosions. Security forces have sealed off the Rawda area,
security forces have engaged in shootouts with alleged jihadists in the capital city since the Feb. 14 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al Hairi. Though these shootouts were largely political in nature, designed to facilitate a dialogue between Washington and Damascus, jihadists have a real incentive to stage attacks in the Levant and target the regime that has offered cooperation to U.S. forces in Iraq against al Qaeda. In the wake of the Lebanon war, a strong need arose in al Qaeda to challenge it's Shiite rival, Hezbollah, for regional fame.

BRIEF REVIEWS
The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror
Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East

by Robert Satloff
Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004. 106 pp. $19.95.

Reviewed by Alberto Fernandez
U.S. Department of State

Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2006
http://www.meforum.org/article/1005

Subtitled Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East, Satloff's brief book gathers previously published articles from 2001-04 plus some new pieces into a useful compendium of the author's thoughtful analyses of the public diplomacy challenges America faces. Full of practical suggestions, this is no dusty tome but a useful and rousing call to action. Satloff's plea that we nurture a wide range of like-minded allies in this ideological struggle is a suggestion ignored at our peril: "the strategy to defeat Islamism must be rooted in promoting the sort of political, social and economic change within existing regimes that denies Islamists opportunities for growth, not in creating a reign of political chaos from which Islamists … stand to benefit most."

Satloff outlines a wide range of helpful initiatives, some which already exist (like English language teaching) but are in need of enhanced funding while others (such as promoting alternative media) are great ideas in search of innovative public diplomacy personnel and new budgets to make them happen. In his final essay, Satloff deftly identifies the structural barriers, most of which have their genesis inside the Beltway, that have hampered the development of an aggressive, consistent, and powerful strategy of ideological engagement with the Muslim world: "a lack of clarity, a lack of priorities, and a lack of urgency."

He was right on target with his criticism as of the book's publication, but this practitioner believes that considerable progress in the right direction began in August 2005 with the appointment of Karen Hughes as undersecretary of state for public diplomacy. Under her dynamic leadership, the battle of ideas has purposefully been joined.
The Challenge of Islam: Encounters in Interfaith Dialogue

by Douglas Pratt
Aldershot, Eng.: Ashgate Publishing, 2005. 266 pp. $29.95.

Reviewed by John Marks
Educational Research Trust, London

Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2006
http://www.meforum.org/article/1006

Pratt has worked "in the field of Christian-Muslim encounter over the past decade" during which he has forged links with the International Islamic University of Malaysia; the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations in Birmingham, England; Al-Azhar University in Cairo; and the Egyptian Ministry of Waqfs—institutions which are not known for their willingness to engage in open discussion of key political issues in the course of interfaith dialogue.

Pratt runs through the origins of Islam (the Prophet, the Qur'an, the Sunna, and Shari‘a) and describes Islamic communities. He then outlines both Christian-Muslim and Jewish-Muslim relations from the seventh century to the present, ending with an account of Islamic ideology in the twentieth century. His work contains useful information but does not adequately cover key concepts that need to be treated honestly if dialogue is to lead to reconciliation. For example, jihad is described primarily as striving for the good life, even though its primary meaning through the centuries has been military conquest. Abrogation of Qur'anic texts is mentioned but it is not made clear that the often-quoted suras (chapters) of peace are cancelled out or abrogated by the later revelations in the suras of war. And Pratt makes no mention of taqiya (dissimulation), which can justify deception in time of war or conflict.

He does, however, give a good—and hence disturbing—account of the rise of anti-Semitism in modern Islam, and he does introduce the reader to Wahhabism and to some modern advocates of Islamism—Abu A‘la Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb—but not others, for example, Hasan al-Banna and Yusuf al-Qaradawi.

The section actually focusing on dialogue with Islam forms less than a quarter of the book. It deals with da'wa (propaganda) and with dialogue, superficially suggesting that negative perceptions of Islam may be overcome by reminding ourselves that "Islam, in a word, is a religion of peace: that is its aim and goal." Pratt also discusses what he calls "some thorny theological topics," such as regarding the God of the Bible and the Qu'ran as in some sense comparable because of their common Abrahamic roots—a position with which many Christians and Jews might not agree. Overall The Challenge of Islam disappoints, given the increasing need for a knowledgeable and critical analysis of the aims of Islamist groups and the responses of other Muslims to them.

Syria Wants Peace on Basis of Relevant UN Resolutions
9-10-2006 22:28:1


DAMASCUS (KUNA) -- Syria expressed hope that the US administration and other western nations would acknowledge the keenness of Arab countries, including itself, to achieve comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East.

Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said in statements published Sunday in Al-Thawra newspaper that his country hopes that America's efforts would head in the right direction and would reach practical solutions for the conflicts that face the people of the Middle East.

Mekdad said "the recent victory in Lebanon encourages us to be optimistic...

we cannot remain silent about losing rights...and the occupation of our lands." Syria wants comprehensive peace in the region based on the UN Security Council's resolutions 242, 338 and 497 which was issued 1981 regarding the occupation of the Golan heights and which declares Israel annexation of the heights as illegal.

Syria wants peace according to the land-for-peace accord reached during the Arab-Israeli peace conference, held in Madrid in the early 90s, as well as the Arab peace initiative that genuinely calls for establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

On the investigative committee of the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafic Al-Hariri, he said those who planned the plot aimed at destroying the special relationship between Syria and Lebanon and at creating instability in the region, he added.

He expressed Syria's keenness on cooperating with the investigative committee in order to show that Israel was the one to benefit from assassinating Al-Hariri.

On terrorism, he said, Syria condemns and combats international terrorism and it differentiates between terrorism and people who fight for their rights and freedom.